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Motivation: Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA) 
Investigating Policy and Guidelines Specific to AI/ML Functions
How can we improve 
our weapon systems 





I suggest we 
ask NOSSA for 
guidance!
It’s “likely” we are 
as safe as using 
non-Ai technology!
The strength of AI is also its weakness!
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AI/ML is a New Development Paradigm
Human               AI System
When expected to 
successfully perform 
critical tasks, the Human
needs the “right/correct” 
training and incentives to 
consistently meet 
expectations. 
Expectations need to 
define a likelihood that 
he/she will be successful 
most of the time.
When expected to 
successfully perform critical 
tasks, the AI System
needs the “right/correct” 
training and algorithm to 
consistently meet 
expectations.
Expectations need to define 
a likelihood that the 
machine will be successful 
most of the time.
This comparison “right/correct” training analogy applies to AI developed 
code but not traditional code.
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Basic System Safety definitions:
• Software Control Category (SCC) -- A numeric number resulting from applying a standard 
method to categorize safety significant software based on its level of autonomy.
• Software Criticality Index (SwCI) -- A numeric number resulting from a combination of SCC 
and severity to determine the LOR tasks required for safety significant software.
• Level of Rigor (LOR) -- per MIL-STD-882 “A specification of the depth and breadth of 
software analysis and verification activities necessary to provide a sufficient level of 
confidence that a safety-critical or safety-related software function will perform as 
required.“  A specific set of tasks to be completed before that safety significant software is 
considered “safe” or representing a certain level of acceptable risk for the system. 
• Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) – The primary analysis used to determine SCC and SwCI
determinations for safety significant software. Each function is evaluated for level of 
autonomy and safety criticality.
• Subsystem Functional Hazard Analysis (SSHA) – A detailed subsystem analysis used to 
determine LOR for safety significant software. 
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FHA Workflow Conducted by System Safety Practitioners
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Stakeholder’s Analysis Table (Subset of List)
# Name/Org Type Want/Need Concern/Loss Notes
1 Safety Engineer/NAWCWD D511000 Analyst Suite of defined LOR tasks and OQE Guilt/Liability from loss of life





Analyst Suite of defined LOR tasks and OQE Guilt/Liability from loss of life
Knows that AI system is Safety Significant but no LOR tool 
set available
3 Warfighter User Assurance of weapon system safety Guilt/Liability from loss of life
Assumes that AI system is safe; unaware of lack of safety 
rigor
4 WSESRB Member Analyst Suite of defined LOR tasks and OQE Guilt/Liability from loss of life
Knows that AI system is Safety Significant but no LOR tool 
set available
5 Program Manager Sponsor Assurance of weapon system safety Guilt/Liability from loss of life Pressured to meet military requirement; accepts safety risk
6 Civilian or Military Victim of Mishap Neutral Observer Safety in Battle Space as Non-Target Personal Death or Injury Unaware of Latent Safety Hazard
7 American Public Neutral Observer Assurance that weapon systems will not kill or injur friendlies or non-combatants Anger/Disapproval
"How could this tragedy happen?"  "Who is responsible?"
"Why was a dangerous weapon system deployed by the US 
8 NOSSA, PM Sponsor, Developers
What processes and policy associated with the various phases of the acquisition 
cycle will be needed to support system safety for AI/ML software? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system, 
PM: Added cost to retrofit safer 
9 NOSSA Sponsor
What tools, guidance and documentation would need to be created to support the 
processes and policy per each group’s needs? Groups: Developers need from 
system safety, System safety practitioners from system safety and Oversight folks 
from system safety.
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
10 NOSSA Sponsor Along with the processes, what analytics need investigation for each user group? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
11 NOSSA Sponsor How would various AI/ML software designs affect the analytical approach? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
12 NOSSA Sponsor
What kind of OQE is required per a given AI/ML technique and implementation 
structure to support a program moving forward? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
13 NOSSA Sponsor Will data and analytics be considered as separate pieces to inspect? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
14 NOSSA Sponsor
During a WSESRB or Technical Review Panel review that involves AI/ML, how would 
systems, data and numbers be presented to allow for proper investigation and 
analysis to ensure contextual accuracy based on group technical background? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
15 NOSSA Sponsor
What are the factors and limitations associated with confidence of numbers 
presented regarding AI/ML performance? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
16 NOSSA Sponsor AI/ML performance is always associated within the context of the training data? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
17 NOSSA Sponsor
What does it mean to perform architecture, design, or code analysis (see MIL-STD-
882E Table V) with an AI/ML system, especially when, for example, even the 
developer has limited understanding on how the neural network works? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
18 NOSSA Sponsor
How will confidence be assured for each user group in terms of how the software 
will perform as specified to AI performance requirements (see MIL-STD-882E 
paragraph 4.4.1.b)?
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
19 NOSSA Sponsor
What would be the type of contractual language associated with AI/ML 
integration/deployment?
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
20 NOSSA Sponsor
 Should it include the complete system because of potential reduction in overall 
system maturity?
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
21 NOSSA Sponsor
Will AI/ML algorithms exponentially increase the complexity of the system under 
review affecting hardware issues involved with processing, bandwidth and storage? 
If not considered, will performance degrade, causing system safety concerns? How 
will this be analyzed? What are the limitations associated with confidence of 
numbers presented regarding AI/ML performance? Note: AI/ML performance is 
always associated within the context of the training data.
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
22 NOSSA Sponsor
What format will allow technical and non- AI/ML technical stakeholders to support 
discussion, understanding and eventual application for their particular AI/ML 
situation? This sets the requirement for how processes and policy should be 
technically written and displayed while still supporting the necessary detail. It is 
anticipated that each group will have a different set of requirements for 
communicating and displaying technical detail related to guidance. What will be the 
training requirements for each group?different set of requirements for 
communicating and displaying technical detail related to guidance. What will be the 
training requirements for each group?
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
23 NOSSA Sponsor 1. how do we build confidence in the AI black box? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
24 NOSSA Sponsor
2. How do we build rigor into, or is it necessary to build rigor into, the training code 
for the AI?
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
25 NOSSA Sponsor Is this the appropriate AI technique to use and is there an non-AI technique that could be used? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
Name/Organization   Type                                Want/Need                                                            Concern/Loss
Note: NOS A is investigating softwa e afety processes to appropriately address ML/AI.
4/21/2021 7
NAVAIR
Operational Use Case of Two Robots Delivering Packages
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AI Type (Working Definition): For system safety concerns, an AI Type of function means that an algorithm will 
be developed: 
(1) from using data approximations to build its algorithm, e.g. from simulations and synthetic data vs an 
equation that accurately represents real world physics, and/or 
(2) when data samples used to build its algorithm is a subset of the actual population size, e.g., training data 
samples from population to support machine learning, training data samples requiring clutter backgrounds.
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Flow to Assess AI Type using Special FHA and SSHA Rigor
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FHA Example for Mission Planner from Sandbox
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SSHA LOR Table Example Based on Data Flow Analysis of Meta-Model 
Selection within the Mission Planner
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